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 Abstract 
 
This paper reexamines the issue of international financial capital mobility, which has 
become today’s economic orthodoxy. The policy discussion is often framed in terms of 
the impossible trinity. That framing distorts discussion by representing capital mobility as 
having equal significance with sovereign monetary policy and control over exchange 
rates. It also distorts discussion by ignoring possibilities for coordinated monetary policy 
and exchange rates, and for managed capital flows. The case for capital mobility rests on 
neo-classical economic efficiency arguments and neo-liberal political arguments. The 
case against capital mobility is based on Keynesian macroeconomic inefficiency 
arguments, neo-Walrasian market failure arguments, and neo-Marxian arguments 
regarding distortion of the social structure of accumulation. Close examination shows the 
case for capital mobility to be extremely flimsy. That points to the ideological dimension 
behind today’s policy orthodoxy. 
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I Introduction 
 The 1990s saw global implementation of the Washington Consensus, a key 
element of which was financial liberalization that included promotion of international 
capital mobility. This paper re-examines the economics of international capital mobility 
and argues there are good economic reasons for restoring capital controls as a standard 
part of the policy arsenal.  
  The current moment constitutes an opportune time to re-engage this issue. The 
policy debate over capital controls has been closed for the past twenty-five years. Now, it 
is gradually being pried open for political and economic reasons. 
 At the political level there is increasing popular disenchantment with 
globalization. At the economic level, proponents of financial liberalization were humbled 
by the unexpectedness and severity of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. That crisis 
has compelled even die-hard liberalizers to qualify talk of capital flow liberalization in 
terms of a) prior development of appropriate financial market institutions, and b) 
sequencing of reforms that start with domestic financial markets and only extend 
gradually to international opening.   
 Additionally, even the International Monetary Fund (Kose et al., 2006) has been 
unable to find clear empirical support for the claim that capital mobility increases growth. 
Instead, where capital mobility is associated with growth, it is also associated with sound 
macroeconomic policies and benign macro conditions. Moreover, countries that have 
grown fastest (China, the East Asian tigers, Chile, India) have all used controls. These 
findings have therefore created space for renewed debate about capital controls. 
II Reframing thinking about capital controls 
 The contemporary view of capital controls is that if they are relevant, they are 
only relevant for developing countries. That view is prompted by the experience of the 
1994 Mexican peso crisis and subsequent tequila effect that impacted Latin American; 
the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian ruble crisis; the 1999 Brazilian 
crisis; and the 2000 Brazilian and Argentine crises. 
 However, the issue of capital controls was previously viewed as extremely 
relevant for industrialized countries and was an important part of the European policy 
landscape in the twenty-five years after World War II. In 1982 capital mobility was at the 
center of the French franc crisis that prompted the Mitterrand government to abandon its 
Keynesian expansionary fiscal policies. Likewise, capital mobility was an issue in the 
Swedish krone and sterling crises of 1992. Most recently, capital mobility has been 
invoked to explain why long term U.S. interest rates did not increase during the period 
2005 – 07 despite the Federal Reserve hiking short term rates. The thinking is that this 
was due to China re-cycling its trade surplus back to the U.S. as capital inflows. The 
implication is that capital mobility remains a legitimate concern for developed countries. 
 Analytical discussion of capital mobility is often framed in terms of Krugman’s 
(1999) construction of the “impossible trinity” that is shown in Figure1. The argument is 
there exists a fundamental inconsistency between the trinity of fixed exchange rates, 
sovereign monetary policy that sets domestic interest rates, and unfettered international 
capital mobility.  
 According to the impossible trinity a country can have any two of these three. If a 
country fixes its exchange rate and interest rate, it needs capital controls to block 
international arbitrage flows that would undermine the exchange and interest rate 
settings. If it fixes the exchange rate and has free capital flows, it loses control over the 
interest rate since monetary policy must be directed to maintaining the exchange rate. If it 
fixes the interest rate and has free capital flows, it loses control over the exchange rate 
which is determined by capital flows. 
 Whereas the economic logic of the impossible trinity is correct, the framework 
engages in intellectual sleight of hand. The exchange rate and interest rate are critical 
macro prices, and a country is unlikely to prosper if it gets these prices wrong. That 
means there is every reason why policymakers should want to control these variables. 
However, there is no equivalent reason for wanting free capital flows. Yet, the impossible 
trinity presents all three as if they are of equal standing, and in doing so distorts 
perceptions and debate. 
III The case for capital mobility 
 The impossible trinity begs the question of why a country would want unrestricted 
capital mobility. There are two sets of arguments as shown in Figure 2. One set is rooted 
in neo-classical microeconomic theory and concerns the efficient allocation of resources. 
The second set is rooted in neo-liberal political economy and concerns the need for 
constraints on government to promote good policy and freedom.  
III.a) Neo-classical economic efficiency arguments 
 The neo-classical microeconomic efficiency arguments concern both stocks and 
flows. On the stock side, the argument is that capital mobility improves portfolio 
investment outcomes. It does this by increasing the range of investment opportunities, 
thereby increasing returns available to savers and increasing possibilities for 
diversification. That increases the efficiency of portfolios, which increases economic 
well-being – though this benefit goes largely to wealthy elites since wealth is highly 
concentrated. 
 A second neo-classical efficiency benefit concerns the organization of global 
production chains. Capital mobility allows companies to acquire foreign production 
facilities, thereby facilitating the organization of global production chains and increasing 
foreign direct investment (FDI). From a conventional neo-classical perspective this can 
increase global productive efficiency through application of the principle of comparative 
advantage, thereby benefitting all countries.  However, such analysis is challenged by 
Gomory and Baumol (2000) and Palley (2008a), who argue that FDI and outsourcing can 
be good for companies but may be bad for national income and wages. Moreover, it is 
also possible to have large-scale FDI without capital mobility, as evidenced by China. 
 The third and most important efficiency claim regarding capital mobility is that it 
increases national saving and investment, thereby enhancing capital accumulation and 
economic growth. This argument is based on the loanable funds theory of interest rates, 
according to which the interest rate is determined by demand and supply in the loanable 
funds market. 
 Analytically, the effects of capital mobility can be described by the following 
model. Prior to capital market opening outcomes in the loanable funds market are 
determined by the following six equations: 
(1) y = y* 
(2) S = I 
(3) S = S(i, y, e)  + [T – G]          Si > 0, Sy > 0, Se >< 0 
(4) I = I(i, y, e)                        Ii < 0,  Iy > 0, Ie < 0   
(5) X(e, yf) = M(i, y, e)          Xe < 0,  Xyf > 0, Me > 0, Mi < 0,  My > 0   
(6) e = pf/p 
Where y = output, y* = full employment (natural) output, S = real domestic saving, T = 
lump sum taxes, G = government spending, I = real domestic investment, X = exports, M 
= imports, i = interest rate, e = exchange rate (foreign currency per unit of domestic 
currency), pf = foreign price level, and p = domestic price level.  
 Equation (1) determines the level of output, which is equal to the full employment 
or natural level of output. Equation (2) is the loanable funds market clearing condition. 
Equation (3) determines national saving, which consists of private and public sector 
saving. Equation (4) is the domestic investment function. Equation (5) is the trade 
balance condition, and equation (6) determines the exchange rate.1 
 The logic of the model is as follows. The level of output is equal to natural output, 
which is determined by the capital stock, labor supply, and the state of technology. The 
loanable funds market then determines the interest rate that equalizes saving and 
investment. Since there is no capital mobility, exports must equal imports. This is 
accomplished by price level adjustment that determines a real exchange rate consistent 
with trade balance.  
 After capital opening the loanable funds market is described by: 
(7) y= y* 
(8) e = pf/p 
(9)  i = if 
                                                            
11 Throughout the paper the exchange rate (e) is denoted as foreign currency per unit of home currency. 
That means a higher value of e corresponds to exchange rate appreciation, and a lower value corresponds to 
depreciation. 
(10) S = S(if, y, e) + [T – G] = S’ 
(11) I = I(if, y, e) + X = I’ 
(12) KM = I’ – S’ 
where if = global interest rate, and KM = capital flow. If I’ > S’ there is a capital inflow, 
and if I’ < S’ there is a capital outflow. The logic is that when I’ > S’ the economy is 
using more resources for investment and exports than it is saving, and this excess demand 
is provided via imports that are financed with capital inflows. The reverse holds for I’ < 
S’. 
 The effect of capital mobility is to set the national interest rate equal to the global 
interest rate. Figure 3 shows the effect of capital opening on a developing economy. Such 
economies are viewed as being constrained by limited saving, but they have strong 
investment demand due to shortage of capital. The domestic interest rate (i*) is above the 
global interest rate (if) because of strong investment demand owing to the country’s 
relative scarcity of capital and saving. Capital mobility supposedly gives the economy 
access to the global saving pool with its lower interest rate. The result is capital inflows 
that increase investment, lower domestic saving, and increase domestic consumption. 
This makes the country better off as capital opening accelerates capital accumulation 
while smoothing inter-temporal consumption, enabling more consumption today that is 
repaid with the returns from increased investment. 
 Figure 4 shows the case of a developed economy that opens itself to capital 
mobility. This case is the symmetric opposite of a developing country. Now the global 
interest rate (if) is above the domestic interest rate (i*) because the country is relatively 
capital abundant compared to the rest of the world. Consequently, there is a net capital 
outflow. Domestic investment falls but domestic saving rises. The logic is that the higher 
interest rate encourages more saving but discourages domestic investment. Instead, 
investment is directed offshore to developing countries where the marginal efficiency of 
investment is higher. The country is made better off because it can access higher returns 
by investing offshore. Interestingly, consumption falls due to increased saving, but 
consumption is higher in future periods due to increased income from higher returns on 
foreign investment. 
 The fourth and final efficiency argument for capital mobility is an informal claim 
that it yields a host of collateral benefits. This seems to be an increasingly popular 
assertion in business media. The claim is that capital mobility fosters trade, FDI, 
technology transfer, and financial development, and together this improves efficiency and 
growth. Unfortunately, this “collateral benefits” claim is challenged by lack of empirical 
support regarding a robust positive association between financial liberalization and 
growth (Kose et al., 2006) Moreover, the claim ignores the fact that trade, financial 
development, FDI, and technology transfer also take place with capital controls.  
III.b) The neo-liberal political economy case for capital mobility 
 The neo-classical economic efficiency argument for capital mobility is 
complemented by neo-liberal political economy arguments. One argument is that capital 
mobility provides a market discipline that improves the quality of governance and policy. 
The claim is capital will tend to exit countries with bad governance and flow toward 
countries with good governance. That in turn creates a race to the top between country 
governments as they compete to attract capital, resulting in better governance and more 
efficient markets that are free of government distortions. 
 A second Hayekian-styled (Hayek, 1944) argument for capital mobility is that the 
freedom to move capital and property is an intrinsic element of personal freedom.  That 
makes capital mobility both a means and an end. Capital mobility helps protect personal 
freedom by disciplining governments, and it is also an essential part of personal freedom. 
However, there is widespread recognition of the legitimacy of restrictions on people 
moving between national jurisdictions, so it is unclear why capital should be treated 
differently. 
 A third argument is that controls generate costly rent seeking (Krueger, 1974). 
Thus, even if there is a market failure that appears to warrant capital controls, such a 
policy solution may generate worse outcomes than doing nothing. This is because 1) 
agents will expend valuable resources engaging in rent seeking activity that aims to 
circumvent controls by influencing government, and 2) such rent-seeking activity may 
corrupt government and contribute to bad policy and governance.  
 A fourth pragmatic argument against capital controls is that they have limited 
effectiveness in the presence of sophisticated financial markets. Carvalho and Garcia 
(2006) report on the Brazilian experience with capital controls in the 1990s and report 
that they were only temporarily effective deterring inflows, for a brief period of two to 
six months. They then hypothesize that this is because financial institutions performed 
sophisticated operations to avoid controls.  
 Balanced against this, several studies by Edwards find capital controls have 
statistically significant effects that go in the theoretically predicted direction.  Gregorio et 
al. (2000) find that unremunerated reserve requirements on inflows tilt the composition of 
inflows toward longer maturity as predicted by theory (Palley, 2005). Edwards (2005) 
reports that countries with capital controls have smaller growth declines once a financial 
crisis begins. Lastly, Edwards and Rigobon (2005) report tightening of capital controls on 
inflows depreciates the exchange rate and capital controls reduce the vulnerability of the 
nominal exchange rate to external shocks.  
 These findings of statistically significant effects from capital controls mean 
controls work even if there is avoidance and evasion. Moreover, the effect of controls 
would be strengthened by greater political commitment to capital controls, tougher 
enforcement of controls with larger penalties, and greater international cooperation 
regarding enforcement that would inevitably come if capital controls were universally 
accepted as a legitimate policy tool.  
IV The case against capital mobility 
 Balanced against the above arguments for capital mobility are three different 
types of arguments against capital mobility. These arguments are illustrated in Figure 5 
and can be labeled (1) the Keynesian macroeconomic efficiency argument, (2) the neo-
Walrasian market failure argument, and (3) the neo-Marxian social structure of 
accumulation argument. 
IV.a) The Keynesian macroeconomic case against capital mobility 
 The Keynesian challenge to capital mobility rests on a fundamentally different 
theoretical construction of the determination of exchange rates, interest rates, saving, and 
investment. Whereas the neo-classical model has the exchange rate determined by 
purchasing power parity (PPP), the Keynesian model treats the exchange rate as a 
financial price that is determined in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Second, interest 
rates are not determined in a fictional loanable funds market, but are instead determined 
in financial markets that can be significantly affected by the policies and actions of 
central banks. Third, saving and investment are determined in the goods market by the 
consumption and investment spending decisions of households and firms, and are 
equalized by output adjustment rather than interest rate adjustment.  
 Figure 6 shows the determination of saving, investment, and net exports in the 
Keynesian model. Output adjusts in response to excess (or deficient) aggregate demand 
(AD), and this adjustment process continues until output and AD are equalized. At that 
point leakages out of the flow of circular income (saving) equal injections into the 
circular flow (investment, government budget deficit, and net exports).  
 This Keynesian process of equilibrium output determination is described by the 
following equations: 
(13) y = AD 
(14) y = C(i, y, e) + S(i, y, e) + T            Ci < 0, Cy > 0, Ce >< 0, Si > 0, Sy > 0, Se >< 0 
(15) AD = C(i, y, e) + I(i, y, e) + G + NX(i, y, e)  
                                                           Ii < 0, Iy > 0, Ie < 0, NXi >< 0, NXy < 0, NXe < 0 
Where y = income (output), AD = aggregate demand, C = consumption, S = saving, T = 
lump-sum tax payments, I = investment spending, G = government spending, and NX = 
net exports (exports minus imports). Combining equations (10) – (12) and re-arranging, 
then yields 
(13) S(i, y, e) = I(i, y, e) + [G – T] + NX(i, y, e) 
Goods market equilibrium requires that demand leakages (S) equal demand injections (I 
+ [G - T] + NX). Given the equilibrium level of income determined in goods markets, 
there is an associated level of net exports. 
 The exchange rate, which affects leakages and injections into the circular flow of 
income, is determined in the foreign exchange market by the inter-play of demand and 
supply for different currencies. The demand for home country currency is principally 
determined by foreigners who need currency to pay for their purchases of the home 
country’s exports and by foreigner desires to purchase assets in the home country. The 
supply of home country currency is principally determined by home country residents 
who sell their currency to buy foreign currency to pay for imports and to purchase foreign 
country assets.  
 Figure 7 shows the determination of the exchange rates in the Keynesian model 
with floating exchange rates. Figure 8 shows the determination of exchange rates in the 
Keynesian model with fixed rates. In the latter case any discrepancy between demand and 
supply at the fixed exchange rate is covered by central bank intervention, and that 
intervention shows up as the official settlement balance (OSB). 
 The Keynesian case against capital mobility rests on the argument that it can 
cause macroeconomic problems, including unemployment and inflation. In a regime of 
fixed exchange rates capital inflows compel official intervention to prevent appreciation, 
which can give rise to undesirable monetary expansion that can cause generalized and 
asset price inflation. Conversely, capital outflows compel intervention to protect the 
exchange rate, and that runs the risk of running out of reserves and tempting speculative 
attacks on the exchange rate. 
 For Keynes (1942), a deeper problem was that a country might need low interest 
rates for full employment, yet capital outflows might compel the monetary authority to 
push the domestic interest rate above that consistent with full employment to protect the 
exchange rate. This “Keynes Problem” is illustrated in Figure 9. The right hand panel 
shows the interest rate (iy) needed to secure full employment output (yT) in the goods 
market, while the left hand panel shows the interest rate (ie) needed to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate (eT) given full employment output and foreign interest rates (if).
 Conventional classical macroeconomics dismisses this Keynes problem on the 
grounds that price deflation will ensure full employment. However, it is now clear that 
price deflation can be destabilizing and can actually aggravate the problem of inadequate 
AD and unemployment (Tobin 1975, 1980; Palley, 2008b, 2008c). 
 With flexible exchange rates, capital openness can lead to large inflows that 
appreciate the exchange rate, causing a contraction of investment spending and net 
exports. That in turn reduces output and employment, as shown in Figure 10. This 
problem is amplified in a globalized world in which capital flows are larger and in which 
economies more sensitive to exchange rates owing to an increase in the share of exports 
and imports in GDP.  
 Moreover, there can be additional problems when one country opens its capital 
markets while others do not. In this event, the country with capital controls can pursue 
strategic “beggar my neighbor” policies that frustrate market exchange rate adjustment 
mechanisms, making it better off at the expense of open country. A recent example of 
this is China, which fixed its exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar at an undervalued rate, 
and capital controls enabled it to maintain that rate despite an enormous trade surplus. 
 A last problem with open capital markets concerns the impact of capital inflows 
on internal balance. Thus, during the recent (2001- 2007) U.S. economic expansion 
capital inflows hampered long-term interest rates from rising and frustrated the Federal 
Reserve’s attempt to raise the general level of interest rates. This contributed to an 
unbalanced expansion marked by a boom in the non-traded (NT) goods sector (housing) 
and a slump in the traded (T) goods sector (manufacturing).  
 This problem is illustrated in Figure 11. The top right hand panel shows non-
traded sector employment as a negative function of the interest rate. The bottom left hand 
panel show traded sector employment as a positive function of the exchange rate defined 
as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. The top left hand panel then relates the 
exchange rate to the domestic interest rate. The problem results when a surge in capital 
inflows (X0 < X1) shifts the exchange rate function left, causing an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and a decline in the interest rate. This spurs a boom in the NT sector and a 
slump in the T sector. 
 Moreover, this shift can be cumulative so that an appreciating exchange rate and 
rising asset prices caused by falling interest rates causes further capital inflows that 
further shift the exchange rate function.2 Policymakers aiming for balance in the NT and 
T goods sector would like to target the interest rate on the NT sector and the exchange 
rate on the T goods sector. Capital mobility frustrates this. 
 To summarize, whereas the classical macroeconomic model predicts 
unambiguously good outcomes from capital mobility, the Keynesian model is less 
sanguine. In the classical model capital mobility impacts economic outcomes via the 
loanable funds market, improving the allocation of saving. In effect, the classical model 
                                                            
2 This pattern has similarities with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. In East Asia, capital inflows 
drove pro-cyclical destabilizing movements in financial markets. Thus, inflows drove interest rates down 
and increased asset prices, giving rise to strong financial accelerator effects that amplified the boom in the 
NT sector. Meanwhile, appreciating exchange rates undermined the T goods sector, contributing to a 
deteriorating trade outlook.  
 
is a corn model in which corn stocks (saving) get reallocated (invested) to countries 
where corn grows faster, thereby producing more corn for all. Moreover, there can be no 
employment impacts as the economy is at full employment. 
 The Keynesian model views the loanable funds market as a fiction. Instead, 
capital flows affect the foreign exchange market, giving rise to exchange rate effects that 
can have significant adverse consequences on employment and output. 
 That raises the question when is capital mobility a good thing in the Keynesian 
model? The short answer is when a country suffers from a shortage of foreign money (i.e 
there is a foreign exchange supply gap). For instance, a developing country may want to 
import capital goods but is running a trade deficit and will not benefit from exchange rate 
depreciation owing to adverse terms of trade effects and higher imported inflation. In this 
case the country may be better off by borrowing abroad.  
 The important feature is the underlying problem is not directly a shortage of 
domestic saving as claimed by loanable funds theory, but rather a shortage of foreign 
exchange to purchase foreign produced goods. The Washington Consensus talks of 
international capital mobility as analogous to domestic capital mobility, thereby framing 
international financial opening as analogous to domestic financial deregulation. From a 
Keynesian perspective that analogy is misplaced, and international financial capital 
mobility is about filling foreign exchange gaps rather than improving financial 
intermediation and the allocation of capital.  
IV.b) The neo-Walrasian case against capital mobility 
 A Keynesian perspective emphasizes macroeconomic problems arising from 
capital mobility. A neo-Walrasian perspective emphasizes microeconomic market failure 
problems that result in allocative inefficiencies, the solution to which are capital controls. 
 One source of micro inefficiency is noise traders (De Long, et al., 1990) who 
generate excessive exchange rate volatility and exchange rate mispricing. That volatility 
and mispricing distorts trade and foreign investment decisions, giving rise to 
microeconomic inefficiencies.3 
 Capital mobility may also amplify proclivities to runs and financial panics by 
encouraging speculative short term “hot money” flows. When these flows reverse, they 
can cause considerable financial disruption. Moreover, the problem of large inflows 
relative to the system and sudden reversals is likely greatest in developing economies in 
which the regulatory and institutional framework is weaker. Furthermore, exchange rate 
fluctuations are especially destabilizing for developing countries as they tend to be 
international debtors with foreign currency denominated debt. 
 The problem of exchange rate instability is illustrated in Figure 12, which shows 
how the foreign exchange market can have multiple equilibria. Capital flows can cause 
significant local volatility around each equilibrium and can also cause large jumps 
between equilibriums. 
 The neo-Walrasian critique rests on imperfections in capital markets – be they due 
to the existence of speculators who create noise and impose negative externalities on 
others or due to imperfect or asymmetric information among market participants.  
 The neo-Walrasian market imperfection approach is consistent with both 
Classical and Keynesian macroeconomics, and neo-Walrasian considerations can be 
included in either type of model. That said, the “aesthetic” impact is larger when neo-
                                                            
3 The issue of microeconomic inefficiency in the foreign exchange market due to speculation is examined 
in Palley (2001a) as part of a discussion of the Tobin tax. 
Walrasian concerns are applied to classical models. This is because they move the 
classical model’s equilibrium away from the first best, enabling the classical model to 
generate the type of sub-optimal outcomes Keynesians are concerned with. Contrastingly, 
adding neo-Walrasian concerns to the Keynesian model merely adds another reason 
(albeit with a different economic logic) why the economy will be away from the first best 
position and why policy intervention is needed.  
IV.c) The neo-Marxian social structure of accumulation case against capital mobility 
 Capital mobility gives financial capital the right of international exit. The neo-
Marxian social structures of accumulation (SSA) approach emphasizes how that right 
confers on capital the power to discipline governments, affect policy, and transform the 
structure of economy (Crotty and Epstein, 1996). This power affects both developed and 
developing economies.  
 The classic example of this power in action is the French franc crisis of 1982-3. 
That crisis compelled the Socialist Party government of President Mitterand in France to 
do a policy U-turn and abandon its Keynesian policies aimed at reflating the French 
economy. In hindsight, that U-turn signaled a permanent movement away from explicitly 
Keynesian policies in Europe. Thereafter, European policymakers shifted their attention 
to creating a common European currency, a project that has imposed a permanent 
deflationary policy bias because of its emphasis on fiscal austerity and very low inflation 
in order to build so-called “monetary credibility” for the new European currency. 
 The debate about the constraining effect of capital mobility on “policy space” 
(Bradford, 2005; Grabel, 2000; Palley, 2001b) partially captures some of the issues raised 
by the SSA critique. Thus, different institutional arrangements and rules affect the space 
available for countries to pursue economic policies of their choosing. This is because 
institutional arrangements and rules affect the costs and benefits of alternative policies. 
 However, the SSA critique runs deeper than the policy space debate. Thus, the 
power given to capital by capital mobility not only affects surface policies, it may also 
dull the aspiration to and feasibility of social democracy. This impact seems to be 
particularly evident in Brazil, where it can be argued that globalization has tamed the left 
(Palley, 2006). Thus, in Brazil under President Lula, poverty alleviation programs appear 
to have replaced an earlier vision of social democracy that would tackle deep lasting 
social and economic inequalities.  
V Abandoning the impossible trinity 
  The impossible trinity focuses on the inconsistency between sovereign monetary 
policy, fixed exchange rates, and free capital flows. That framing has promoted today’s 
policy configuration that consists of sovereign monetary policy, free capital flows, and 
floating exchange rates. 
 The problem with the impossible trinity is that it misrepresents the policy choice, 
making it look as if the current configuration is an optimal policy combination when it is 
not. In this regard, there are two types of misrepresentation. The first is to make it look as 
if sovereign monetary policy, control over the exchange rate, and free capital flows are of 
equal policy importance, when they are not. The second is that the impossible trinity 
presents an incomplete policy menu that leaves much off the table. This omission 
includes a) coordinated monetary policy across countries; b) managed exchange rates 
between countries; and c) managed capital flows.  
 The impossible trinity emerged out of the work of Milton Friedman (1953) and 
Robert Mundell (1961a, b). That work is infused with the laissez-faire predispositions of 
those authors, and as such the impossible trinity frame traps policy debate by obscuring 
other possibilities. That suggests it is time to time to abandon the impossible trinity 
frame.  
 Figure 13 shows how policy has evolved over the decades, shifting from a gold 
standard regime of fixed exchange rates with capital mobility to the current regime of 
flexible exchange rates with capital mobility. The decade of the 1970s was pivotal. The 
pressures of that decade were used to ram through a program of deregulation and laissez-
faire in all spheres of policy, including international economic policy. As a result, 
policymakers too easily surrendered the benefits of capital controls.  
 At this stage there is need to create a new policy agenda of managed exchange 
rates and managed capital flows. That agenda can be thought of as moving to the center 
of the box in Figure 13, and it aims to capture the advantages of both fixed and flexible 
exchange rates and both free and controlled capital flows. The impossible trinity should 
be replaced by a possible trinity of coordinated monetary policy, managed exchange 
rates, and managed capital flows. This possible trinity is shown in Figure 14, and its 
elements are mutually supportive rather than antagonistic. 
VI Conclusion: the politics and sociology of policy advice 
 Capital controls can contribute significantly to economic stability and create 
important space for autonomous national economic policy. Whether such controls are 
well or poorly used depends on the quality of governance. Neo-liberals tend to 
automatically assume they will be used badly and make that assumption a centerpiece of 
opposition against capital controls. However, a combination of democratic transparent 
accountable government, a professionalized civil service, and strong civil society can 
ensure that capital controls are used well. The neo-liberal concern with regulatory capture 
is real, but the answer should be promotion of effective governance rather than 
abandonment of this important policy tool. 
 Capital mobility has become today’s economic orthodoxy, yet the pure economic 
case for capital mobility is amazingly flimsy. That capital mobility dominates the policy 
agenda so completely is indicative of the ideological dimension of the debate. 
 Official policy discussion regarding capital controls and exchange rate regimes 
has been led by institutions such as the International Monetary fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 
Bank for International settlements (BIS). These organizations are peopled by high-paid 
international bureaucrats drawn from around the world, who own global investment 
portfolios, and have homes and family in more than one country. Adopting a strictly neo-
classical standpoint this suggests these bureaucrats have a strong private interest in 
capital mobility, which likely taints the advice these institutions provide. That alone is 
grounds for fresh public debate over capital controls.  
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Figure 5. The case against capital Mobility
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Figure 6. Determination of saving, investment, & net exports in the 
Keynesian model.
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Figure 7. Determination of exchange rates in the Keynesian 
model with floating rates
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Figure 11. The Greenspan Problem (X0 < X1)
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 Figure 12. The Problem of Exchange Rate Instability 
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